The 
Introduction
With the sharp rise of security risks and threats, for making the whole network to be a trusted computing circumstance from endpoints at the bottom to the security architecture at the top, the TNC Work Group of Trusted Computing Group (TCG) defines an open solution architecture that enforces policies regarding endpoint integrity when granting access to a network [1] . However, it doesn't refer to the unified identity authentication. On the other side, the existing schemes based on PKI/PMI, WSSecurity, Kerberos and so on can't support the TNC environment. Thus, it is very valuable to research the unified authentication problem in trusted platform, which plays an important role in extending the trusted computing mechanism and perfecting the access control mechanism.
Nowadays, IBE has become a new research direction of the public key encryption. Because of its centralized key generation method, IBE is suitable for the situation of requiring regularly destroying the datagram under the public key architecture. Especially, its performance is superior to PKI.
In order to accomplish the unified authentication in trusted network, this paper gives a scheme supporting multiple authentication modes based on IBE named IEUAS. IEUAS authenticates the identity of a user by loading different authentication plugins to communicate with the related authentication servers. Upon the legal user, a lightweight IBE system enforces the identity management, the key management, the application management and the domain management. Moreover, SSO and cross-domain SSO are accomplished. The experiment results show IEUAS can effectively solve the unified authentication problem in TNC, and provide better security, efficiency and availability.
The remainder of this paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the relevant research. Section 3 points out the IEUAS architecture and its work flow. Section 4 analyzes the key design of IEUAS. The experiment results are given in section 5. Summaries and References are given in section 6 and 7.
Relevant research
TNC is a technical means of extending trusted computing mechanism into a network, which enlarges the application range of trusted platform. That is, before an endpoint accesses a network, its identity is authenticated and its platform security posture is assessed. If the authentication and assessment results satisfy the security policies of network admission, the endpoint is permitted to connect into the network. If not, the endpoint is connected into a pre-appointed isolated area to be patched and upgraded. Reference [2] studies solutions based on authentication standards for enabling TNC in open, web-based scenarios, furthermore researches an architectural model and a communication scheme based on standardized protocols and message formats. Reference [3] comes up with an access model for the terminals without meeting the requirements in TNC specifications, and discusses its work flow and communication process. The researches above have promoted the development of the TNC technology from different aspects. Nonetheless, don't mention how to uniformly manage and use users' accounts in an authorized security context.
In the identity authentication, reference [4] summarizes an authentication model for large scale wireless network using dynamic key cryptography and group key management. Reference [5] studies an authentication way without password sending in TAmI using Hashing Algorithm. Reference [6] proposes an improved deniable authentication protocol based on ElGamal cryptography. Reference [7] gives a PKI based authentication mechanism exploiting the route discovery and route reply to publish self-issued certificates in a distributed fashion. These references have provided the valuable solutions about identity authentication. But, they don't involve in TNC.
With respect to the public key encryption, many researchers focus on finding and constructing the available and efficient IBE system. Reference [8] summarizes the concept of IBE that uses the identity of message receiver as the public key to encrypt the messages. To compare with the traditional public key encryption, IBE don't need the certificate management, which simplifies the implementation of the security communication. Reference [9] presents the first efficient and secure IBE scheme that utilizes few exponent arithmetic and double linear mapping calculation in the encryption and decryption, but its public parameters are very large. Reference [10] introduces the concept of Hierarchical IdentityBased Encryption (HIBE) which aims at solving the overload problem of single Private Key Generator (PKG) and the deployment and application problems of the IBE scheme in the distributed circumstance. Reference [11] studies an identity-based authorization mechanism using IBE algorithm, which could satisfy the demands of the process from access requests to the authorized access control.
From what has been discussed above, we are inspired to propose a unified authentication scheme supporting multi-authentication modes based on IBE in trusted network named IEUAS. IEUAS implements the identity authentication by different plugins to communicate with the interrelated authentication servers, which shields the details of every authentication mode. In accordance with the legal identity, a lightweight IBE system realizes the identity management, the key management, the application management and the domain management. Moreover, SSO and cross-domain SSO are achieved. So, IEUAS further solves and improves the security sharing problem of trusted resources.
IEUAS infrastructure

IEUAS architecture
The main parts of TNC are: the Access Requestor (AR), the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), the Policy Decision Point (PDP), the Metadata Access Point Server (MAPS) and the MAP Client (MAPC).
• The AR requests access to a protected network by collecting and sending the security posture information to the PEP.
• The PEP consults the PDP whether to grant access or not.
• The PDP authenticates AR's identity and verifies if endpoint integrity complies with local security policies. Then, it decides to permit, isolate or deny access.
• The MAPS aggregates the data about network traffic, management and security which are published, subscribed and searched by other components to help make decision and enforce policies.
• The MAPCs incorporate the Flow Controller and the Sensor which coordinate with the PEP and the PDP in monitoring network activities and enforcing network security policy compliance.
As illustrated in Fig.1 , on the basis of the TNC architecture, we add five parts: the Authentication Server (AS), the Identity Management Point (IMP), the Key Management Point (KMP), the Application Management Point (AMP) and the Domain Management Point (DMP).
• The AS is responsible to authenticate the identity of the AR.
• The IMP marks, distributes and maintains the identity of the legal user. In addition, it maps the ARs in other trusted domains.
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• The KMP generates and maintains keys in an automatic, secure and timed pattern. These keys are used to accomplish the secure communication among components.
• The AMP manages the applications in local domain and maps the applications in other trusted domains. At the same time, it manages the application evaluation and authorizes the access of the legal AR in local domain. Besides, the AMP realizes SSO.
• The DMP maintains a trust file by cross certification among the DMPs, which achieves identity registration and SSO across domains.
We improve the design of the PDP. Firstly, all kinds of authentication plugins are integrated into the PDP to extract different identity credentials which are submitted to the correlative AS. Secondly, a module calculating the Security Degree value of the AR ( 
Work flow of IEUAS
The work flow of IEUAS is as depicted in Fig.2 . Therein, the steps marked by the dotted line and the asterisk (*) indicate the authentication failure branches.
Figure 2. Work flow of IEUAS
Step 1: The AR requests resources of the application.
Step 2: The PEP consults the PDP whether to grant access or not.
Step 3: The PDP calls the relevant plugin in line with the authentication mode, and communicates with the correlative AS to authenticate the identity of the AR.
Step 4: If the AR is legal, the PDP sends the success message to the IMP. If the AR is illegal, the PDP sends the failure message to the PEP.
Step 5: the IMP uniformly marks the identity of the AR, and sends the registration information to the PDP, the KMP and the AMP.
Step 6: The KMP issues the private key for the legal AR to the PDP.
Step 7: The PDP sends the decision and the private key to the PEP.
Step 8: The PEP executes the PDP's decision and sends the private key to the AR.
Step 9: The AR accesses resources of the application.
Step 10: The application queries the AMP about the AR.
Step 11: If the AR is registered, the AMP collects Step 12: The AMP checks if the identity of the AR is consistent with the binding information of the original account about the application. If binding is valid, the AMP returns the success message and the identity of the AR to the application.
Step 13: The application uses the identity of the AR as the public key to encrypt the messages for the AR. The AR uses its own private key to decrypt the messages, and vice versa.
When the AR logs off, it requests to the PDP. The PDP sends the request to the IMP. The IMP deletes the identity information of the AR and sends the cancellation message to the PDP, the AMP and the KMP. The AMP and the KMP also delete the information of the AR and send the success message to the PDP. The PDP cancels the login of the AR. Step 1: The AR A accesses resources of the application B
Work flow of cross-domain access
*
Step 2: The application B * queries the AMP A about the AR A .
Step 3: If the AR A is registered, the AMP A collects A AR SD V from the PDP A .
Step 4: Because the application B * is just a mapping, the AMP A has not Step 5: The DMP A sends the registration information and A AR SD V to the DMP B .
Step 6: The DMP B sends the registration information and 
Key design of IEUAS
Identity management mechanism
The identity management mechanism mainly accomplishes the unified management of the ARs' identity. It is composed of three parts as follows: 1) Identity registration/cancellation If the AR has been successfully authenticated, the IMP marks and maintains the identity information of the legal AR. The marking rule is "local domain name + the device name + the user name + the MAC address + the hard disk serial number". When the AR logs off, the IMP cancels the identity information of the AR.
2) Registration/cancellation information distribution The IMP distributes the registration/cancellation information to the PDP, the KMP and the AMP.
3) AR mapping When the DMP sends the registration information of the ARs in other trusted domains, the IMP creates the mappings of the ARs.
Key management mechanism
The key management mechanism consists of two parts: one is the PKG; another is the Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG). Reference [12] proposes a kind of lightweight identity-based encryption algorithm according to the features of wireless sensor networks, gives the security proof under the standard mode and analyzes the advantages from comparing with other IBE schemes. We learn the scheme of reference [12] to realize the PKG algorithm. Moreover, we learn the idea of reference [13] to present an improved PRNG algorithm.
The key management mechanism maintains two key files: one is in use; the other is in update. Thus, the KMP periodically changes the master key of the system. In line with the master key, the KMP generates the private keys of the components in local domain. When the key file in update has finished, the KMP switches the two key files to accomplish the real-time update of the keys of all components.
1) PKG algorithm At first, we define the symbols as shown in Table 1 . 
A large prime number. A bilinear function. The identity of the AR. The plaintext.
Two multiplicative cyclic groups whose orders are q. The set of the positive integers which are less than q. The integer multiplicative group mod q. x is a random number chosen from Z q
The PKG algorithm is described as follows:
Step 1: Initialization.
Choose the master key of the system (x), the generator of G 1 (p) and
The public parameters of the system are { } 
Step 3: Encryption. Select Step 4: Decryption. Use d to decrypt C for getting M as Eq. (3):
Proposition: The encryption and decryption is consistent. Proof: 
2) PRNG algorithm
Step 1: Extract the CPU serial number (SN CPU ), the Hard Disk serial number (SN HD ) and current system time (T). Add them together as Eq. (4) to get an initial string (a).
CPU HD
Step 2: Select a secure hash function (H). Calculate the string (b) as Eq. (5):
Step 3: Sequentially separate b into eight numbers to set a list marked as
. According to Procedure 1 shown as Fig.4 below, get the random number (r). 
Application management mechanism
The application management mechanism includes four parts as follows: 1) Application registration/cancellation When a new application adds into the network, the AMP registers it and sets SD app V . Besides, the AMP maps the applications in other trusted domains and locates their domain names. When an application quits the network, the AMP cancels its information.
2) Application evaluation In the light of the communication experience, an application publishes the Security Evaluation value (V SE ) about access to the AMP. The AMP can store, query, add, modify and delete V SE .
3) Application authorization When the AR requests access to an application, the AMP validates the registration information of the AR. If the AR is legal, the AMP collects 
In addition, the Timer calculates a period of time (T SD ) to trigger the re-evaluation of 
Simulation experiment and performance analysis
In order to verify the performance of IEUAS (ECC and 160 bits), we implement the simulation experiment as shown in Fig.1 , by using the developer tools provided by TCG and adding our own codes. For the comparison purpose, we implement the Waters scheme (ECC and 160 bits) in reference [9] , the ElGamal scheme (ElGamal and 1024 bits) in reference [6] and the PKI scheme (RSA and 1024 bits) in reference [7] . In four schemes, IEUAS has the shorter key, the less memory, the quicker speed and the higher security. We test the ability and performance of unified authentication of four schemes in the same threat frequency. Table 2 shows the experiment result data. Fig.5 indicates the response time respectively for 10 times in four schemes. We can see the success rate of authentication is higher and the average response time of the system is shorter in IEUAS than those in other three schemes. 
Conclusions
At present, a unified authentication method is lack in TNC. It is valuable and important to complete the whole access control architecture. To make up for the shortage, this paper brings forward a new scheme supporting multi-authentication modes based on IBE in trusted network (IEUAS). In IEUAS, the identity of a user is authenticated by utilizing different plugins to communicate with the relevant authentication servers. Afterwards, the identity management mechanism manages, distributes and maps the legal identities; the key management mechanism generates and maintains the keys; the application management mechanism manages and maps the applications, manages the application evaluation and authorizes access, furthermore realizes SSO; the domain management mechanism achieves cross certification, identity registration and SSO across domains. The experiment results prove IEUAS can effectively solve the unified authentication problem under the framework of TNC, and provide better security, efficiency and availability by comparing with other three schemes. The future work of IEUAS may go on with completing the security architecture of access control in trusted network, improving the IBE system, strengthening the security and performance of cryptographic algorithms.
